// Copyright 2017 The go-ethereum Authors // This file is part of the go-ethereum library. // // The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify // it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by // the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or // (at your option) any later version. // // The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, // but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of // MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the // GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. // // You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License // along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see . package clique import ( "bytes" "crypto/ecdsa" "sort" "testing" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/common" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/types" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/core/vm" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/crypto" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/ethdb" "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/params" ) // testerAccountPool is a pool to maintain currently active tester accounts, // mapped from textual names used in the tests below to actual Ethereum private // keys capable of signing transactions. type testerAccountPool struct { accounts map[string]*ecdsa.PrivateKey } func newTesterAccountPool() *testerAccountPool { return &testerAccountPool{ accounts: make(map[string]*ecdsa.PrivateKey), } } // checkpoint creates a Clique checkpoint signer section from the provided list // of authorized signers and embeds it into the provided header. func (ap *testerAccountPool) checkpoint(header *types.Header, signers []string) { auths := make([]common.Address, len(signers)) for i, signer := range signers { auths[i] = ap.address(signer) } sort.Sort(signersAscending(auths)) for i, auth := range auths { copy(header.Extra[extraVanity+i*common.AddressLength:], auth.Bytes()) } } // address retrieves the Ethereum address of a tester account by label, creating // a new account if no previous one exists yet. func (ap *testerAccountPool) address(account string) common.Address { // Return the zero account for non-addresses if account == "" { return common.Address{} } // Ensure we have a persistent key for the account if ap.accounts[account] == nil { ap.accounts[account], _ = crypto.GenerateKey() } // Resolve and return the Ethereum address return crypto.PubkeyToAddress(ap.accounts[account].PublicKey) } // sign calculates a Clique digital signature for the given block and embeds it // back into the header. func (ap *testerAccountPool) sign(header *types.Header, signer string) { // Ensure we have a persistent key for the signer if ap.accounts[signer] == nil { ap.accounts[signer], _ = crypto.GenerateKey() } // Sign the header and embed the signature in extra data sig, _ := crypto.Sign(sigHash(header).Bytes(), ap.accounts[signer]) copy(header.Extra[len(header.Extra)-extraSeal:], sig) } // testerVote represents a single block signed by a parcitular account, where // the account may or may not have cast a Clique vote. type testerVote struct { signer string voted string auth bool checkpoint []string newbatch bool } // Tests that Clique signer voting is evaluated correctly for various simple and // complex scenarios, as well as that a few special corner cases fail correctly. func TestClique(t *testing.T) { // Define the various voting scenarios to test tests := []struct { epoch uint64 signers []string votes []testerVote results []string failure error }{ { // Single signer, no votes cast signers: []string{"A"}, votes: []testerVote{{signer: "A"}}, results: []string{"A"}, }, { // Single signer, voting to add two others (only accept first, second needs 2 votes) signers: []string{"A"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: true}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: true}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Two signers, voting to add three others (only accept first two, third needs 3 votes already) signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: true}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: true}, {signer: "A", voted: "D", auth: true}, {signer: "B", voted: "D", auth: true}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A", voted: "E", auth: true}, {signer: "B", voted: "E", auth: true}, }, results: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, }, { // Single signer, dropping itself (weird, but one less cornercase by explicitly allowing this) signers: []string{"A"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "A", auth: false}, }, results: []string{}, }, { // Two signers, actually needing mutual consent to drop either of them (not fulfilled) signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Two signers, actually needing mutual consent to drop either of them (fulfilled) signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "B", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A"}, }, { // Three signers, two of them deciding to drop the third signers: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Four signers, consensus of two not being enough to drop anyone signers: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, }, { // Four signers, consensus of three already being enough to drop someone signers: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "C", voted: "D", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, }, { // Authorizations are counted once per signer per target signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: true}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: true}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: true}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Authorizing multiple accounts concurrently is permitted signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: true}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", voted: "D", auth: true}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "D", auth: true}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: true}, }, results: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, }, { // Deauthorizations are counted once per signer per target signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: false}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: false}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Deauthorizing multiple accounts concurrently is permitted signers: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "C", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Votes from deauthorized signers are discarded immediately (deauth votes) signers: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "C", voted: "B", auth: false}, {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Votes from deauthorized signers are discarded immediately (auth votes) signers: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "C", voted: "B", auth: false}, {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "A", voted: "B", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Cascading changes are not allowed, only the account being voted on may change signers: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "C", voted: "D", auth: false}, }, results: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, }, { // Changes reaching consensus out of bounds (via a deauth) execute on touch signers: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "C", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "C", voted: "C", auth: true}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // Changes reaching consensus out of bounds (via a deauth) may go out of consensus on first touch signers: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: false}, {signer: "C"}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "C", voted: "D", auth: false}, {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: true}, }, results: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, }, { // Ensure that pending votes don't survive authorization status changes. This // corner case can only appear if a signer is quickly added, removed and then // readded (or the inverse), while one of the original voters dropped. If a // past vote is left cached in the system somewhere, this will interfere with // the final signer outcome. signers: []string{"A", "B", "C", "D", "E"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "F", auth: true}, // Authorize F, 3 votes needed {signer: "B", voted: "F", auth: true}, {signer: "C", voted: "F", auth: true}, {signer: "D", voted: "F", auth: false}, // Deauthorize F, 4 votes needed (leave A's previous vote "unchanged") {signer: "E", voted: "F", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "F", auth: false}, {signer: "C", voted: "F", auth: false}, {signer: "D", voted: "F", auth: true}, // Almost authorize F, 2/3 votes needed {signer: "E", voted: "F", auth: true}, {signer: "B", voted: "A", auth: false}, // Deauthorize A, 3 votes needed {signer: "C", voted: "A", auth: false}, {signer: "D", voted: "A", auth: false}, {signer: "B", voted: "F", auth: true}, // Finish authorizing F, 3/3 votes needed }, results: []string{"B", "C", "D", "E", "F"}, }, { // Epoch transitions reset all votes to allow chain checkpointing epoch: 3, signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A", voted: "C", auth: true}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", checkpoint: []string{"A", "B"}}, {signer: "B", voted: "C", auth: true}, }, results: []string{"A", "B"}, }, { // An unauthorized signer should not be able to sign blocks signers: []string{"A"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "B"}, }, failure: errUnauthorizedSigner, }, { // An authorized signer that signed recenty should not be able to sign again signers: []string{"A", "B"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A"}, {signer: "A"}, }, failure: errRecentlySigned, }, { // Recent signatures should not reset on checkpoint blocks imported in a batch epoch: 3, signers: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", checkpoint: []string{"A", "B", "C"}}, {signer: "A"}, }, failure: errRecentlySigned, }, { // Recent signatures should not reset on checkpoint blocks imported in a new // batch (https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/17593). Whilst this // seems overly specific and weird, it was a Rinkeby consensus split. epoch: 3, signers: []string{"A", "B", "C"}, votes: []testerVote{ {signer: "A"}, {signer: "B"}, {signer: "A", checkpoint: []string{"A", "B", "C"}}, {signer: "A", newbatch: true}, }, failure: errRecentlySigned, }, } // Run through the scenarios and test them for i, tt := range tests { // Create the account pool and generate the initial set of signers accounts := newTesterAccountPool() signers := make([]common.Address, len(tt.signers)) for j, signer := range tt.signers { signers[j] = accounts.address(signer) } for j := 0; j < len(signers); j++ { for k := j + 1; k < len(signers); k++ { if bytes.Compare(signers[j][:], signers[k][:]) > 0 { signers[j], signers[k] = signers[k], signers[j] } } } // Create the genesis block with the initial set of signers genesis := &core.Genesis{ ExtraData: make([]byte, extraVanity+common.AddressLength*len(signers)+extraSeal), } for j, signer := range signers { copy(genesis.ExtraData[extraVanity+j*common.AddressLength:], signer[:]) } // Create a pristine blockchain with the genesis injected db := ethdb.NewMemDatabase() genesis.Commit(db) // Assemble a chain of headers from the cast votes config := *params.TestChainConfig config.Clique = ¶ms.CliqueConfig{ Period: 1, Epoch: tt.epoch, } engine := New(config.Clique, db) engine.fakeDiff = true blocks, _ := core.GenerateChain(&config, genesis.ToBlock(db), engine, db, len(tt.votes), func(j int, gen *core.BlockGen) { // Cast the vote contained in this block gen.SetCoinbase(accounts.address(tt.votes[j].voted)) if tt.votes[j].auth { var nonce types.BlockNonce copy(nonce[:], nonceAuthVote) gen.SetNonce(nonce) } }) // Iterate through the blocks and seal them individually for j, block := range blocks { // Geth the header and prepare it for signing header := block.Header() if j > 0 { header.ParentHash = blocks[j-1].Hash() } header.Extra = make([]byte, extraVanity+extraSeal) if auths := tt.votes[j].checkpoint; auths != nil { header.Extra = make([]byte, extraVanity+len(auths)*common.AddressLength+extraSeal) accounts.checkpoint(header, auths) } header.Difficulty = diffInTurn // Ignored, we just need a valid number // Generate the signature, embed it into the header and the block accounts.sign(header, tt.votes[j].signer) blocks[j] = block.WithSeal(header) } // Split the blocks up into individual import batches (cornercase testing) batches := [][]*types.Block{nil} for j, block := range blocks { if tt.votes[j].newbatch { batches = append(batches, nil) } batches[len(batches)-1] = append(batches[len(batches)-1], block) } // Pass all the headers through clique and ensure tallying succeeds chain, err := core.NewBlockChain(db, nil, &config, engine, vm.Config{}) if err != nil { t.Errorf("test %d: failed to create test chain: %v", i, err) continue } failed := false for j := 0; j < len(batches)-1; j++ { if k, err := chain.InsertChain(batches[j]); err != nil { t.Errorf("test %d: failed to import batch %d, block %d: %v", i, j, k, err) failed = true break } } if failed { continue } if _, err = chain.InsertChain(batches[len(batches)-1]); err != tt.failure { t.Errorf("test %d: failure mismatch: have %v, want %v", i, err, tt.failure) } if tt.failure != nil { continue } // No failure was produced or requested, generate the final voting snapshot head := blocks[len(blocks)-1] snap, err := engine.snapshot(chain, head.NumberU64(), head.Hash(), nil) if err != nil { t.Errorf("test %d: failed to retrieve voting snapshot: %v", i, err) continue } // Verify the final list of signers against the expected ones signers = make([]common.Address, len(tt.results)) for j, signer := range tt.results { signers[j] = accounts.address(signer) } for j := 0; j < len(signers); j++ { for k := j + 1; k < len(signers); k++ { if bytes.Compare(signers[j][:], signers[k][:]) > 0 { signers[j], signers[k] = signers[k], signers[j] } } } result := snap.signers() if len(result) != len(signers) { t.Errorf("test %d: signers mismatch: have %x, want %x", i, result, signers) continue } for j := 0; j < len(result); j++ { if !bytes.Equal(result[j][:], signers[j][:]) { t.Errorf("test %d, signer %d: signer mismatch: have %x, want %x", i, j, result[j], signers[j]) } } } }