more passing

pull/3478/head
Nick Armstrong 3 years ago
parent 92f07bae1b
commit 22827223c0
  1. 4
      certora/scripts/ERC20VotesRule.sh
  2. 88
      certora/specs/ERC20Votes.spec

@ -19,5 +19,5 @@ certoraRun \
--optimistic_loop \
--rule ${rule} \
--msg "${msg}" \
--staging "Eyal/SanityWithoutCallTrace" \
# --rule_sanity \
--staging "alex/new-dt-hashing-alpha" \
--rule_sanity \

@ -153,14 +153,18 @@ invariant no_delegate_no_checkpoints(address account)
// converted from an invariant to a rule to slightly change the logic
// if the fromBlock is the same as before, then the number of checkpoints stays the same
// however if the fromBlock is new than the number of checkpoints increases
// passes, fails rule sanity because tautology check seems to be bugged
rule unique_checkpoints_rule(method f) {
env e; calldataarg args;
require e.block.number > 0; // we don't care about this exception
// require e.block.number > 0; // we don't care about this exception
address account;
// address delegates_pre = delegates(account);
require unsafeNumCheckpoints(account) < 4294967295; // 2^32 // we don't want to deal with the checkpoint overflow error here
// require unsafeNumCheckpoints(account) < 1000000; // 2^32 // we don't want to deal with the checkpoint overflow error here
uint32 num_ckpts_ = numCheckpoints(account);
uint32 fromBlock_ = num_ckpts_ == 0 ? 0 : ckptFromBlock(account, num_ckpts_ - 1);
@ -171,8 +175,8 @@ rule unique_checkpoints_rule(method f) {
uint32 _fromBlock = _num_ckpts == 0 ? 0 : ckptFromBlock(account, _num_ckpts - 1);
// assert fromBlock_ == _fromBlock => num_ckpts_ == _num_ckpts, "same fromBlock, new checkpoint";
assert doubleFromBlock(account) => num_ckpts_ == _num_ckpts, "same fromBlock, new checkpoint";
assert fromBlock_ == _fromBlock => num_ckpts_ == _num_ckpts || _num_ckpts == 1, "same fromBlock, new checkpoint";
// assert doubleFromBlock(account) => num_ckpts_ == _num_ckpts, "same fromBlock, new checkpoint";
// this assert fails consistently
// assert !doubleFromBlock(account) => ckpts_ != _ckpts, "new fromBlock but total checkpoints not being increased";
}
@ -180,16 +184,22 @@ rule unique_checkpoints_rule(method f) {
// assumes neither account has delegated
// currently fails due to this scenario. A has maxint number of checkpoints
// an additional checkpoint is added which overflows and sets A's votes to 0
// passes + rule sanity (- a bad tautology check)
rule transfer_safe() {
env e;
uint256 amount;
address a; address b;
require a != b;
require delegates(a) != delegates(b); // confirmed if they both delegate to the same person then transfer keeps the votes the sameå
// require a != b;
require delegates(a) != delegates(b); // confirmed if they both delegate to the same person then transfer keeps the votes the same
// requireInvariant fromBlock_constrains_numBlocks(a);
// requireInvariant fromBlock_constrains_numBlocks(b);
// requireInvariant totalVotes_gte_accounts(a, b);
// require lastIndex(delegates(a)) < 1000000;
// require lastIndex(delegates(b)) < 1000000;
require numCheckpoints(delegates(a)) < 1000000;
require numCheckpoints(delegates(b)) < 1000000;
uint256 votesA_pre = getVotes(delegates(a));
uint256 votesB_pre = getVotes(delegates(b));
@ -201,9 +211,9 @@ rule transfer_safe() {
erc20votes.transferFrom(e, a, b, amount);
require lastIndex(delegates(a)) < 1000000;
require lastIndex(delegates(b)) < 1000000;
// require lastIndex(delegates(a)) < 1000000;
// require lastIndex(delegates(b)) < 1000000;
mathint totalVotes_post = totalVotes();
uint256 votesA_post = getVotes(delegates(a));
@ -236,24 +246,6 @@ rule delegates_safe(method f) filtered {f -> (f.selector != delegate(address).se
assert pre == post, "invalid delegate change";
}
rule delegator_votes_removed() {
env e;
address delegator; address delegatee;
require delegator != delegatee;
require delegates(delegator) == 0; // has not delegated
uint256 pre = getVotes(delegator);
_delegate(e, delegator, delegatee);
uint256 balance = balanceOf(e, delegator);
uint256 post = getVotes(delegator);
assert post == pre - balance, "delegator retained votes";
}
// delegates increases the delegatee's votes by the proper amount
// passes + rule sanity
rule delegatee_receives_votes() {
@ -263,6 +255,7 @@ rule delegatee_receives_votes() {
require delegates(delegator) != delegatee;
require delegatee != 0x0;
uint256 delegator_bal = balanceOf(e, delegator);
uint256 votes_= getVotes(delegatee);
@ -275,14 +268,14 @@ rule delegatee_receives_votes() {
assert _votes == votes_ + delegator_bal, "delegatee did not receive votes";
}
rule previous_delegatee_zeroed() {
// passes + rule sanity
rule previous_delegatee_votes_removed() {
env e;
address delegator; address delegatee; address third;
require third != delegatee;
require third != delegator;
require delegates(delegator) == third;
// for third to have been delegated to, it must have a checkpoint
require numCheckpoints(third) < 1000000;
uint256 delegator_bal = balanceOf(e, delegator);
uint256 votes_ = getVotes(third);
@ -291,7 +284,7 @@ rule previous_delegatee_zeroed() {
uint256 _votes = getVotes(third);
assert _votes == votes_ - delegator_bal, "votes not removed from the previous delegatee";
assert third != 0x0 => _votes == votes_ - delegator_bal, "votes not removed from the previous delegatee";
}
// passes with rule sanity
@ -311,39 +304,40 @@ rule delegate_contained() {
assert votes_ == _votes, "votes not contained";
}
// checks all of the above rules with front running
// checks all of the above delegate rules with front running
rule delegate_no_frontrunning(method f) {
env e; calldataarg args;
address delegator; address delegatee; address third; address other;
require delegator != delegatee;
require delegates(delegator) == third;
require third != delegatee;
require other != third;
require other != delegatee;
require delegatee != 0x0;
uint256 delegator_bal = erc20votes.balanceOf(e, delegator);
require numCheckpoints(delegatee) < 1000000;
require numCheckpoints(third) < 1000000;
uint256 dr_ = getVotes(delegator);
uint256 de_ = getVotes(delegatee);
uint256 third_ = getVotes(third);
uint256 other_ = getVotes(other);
uint256 delegatee_votes_ = getVotes(delegatee);
uint256 third_votes_ = getVotes(third);
uint256 other_votes_ = getVotes(other);
// require third is address for previous delegator
f(e, args);
uint256 delegator_bal = erc20votes.balanceOf(e, delegator);
_delegate(e, delegator, delegatee);
uint256 _dr = getVotes(delegator);
uint256 _de = getVotes(delegatee);
uint256 _third = getVotes(third);
uint256 _other = getVotes(other);
uint256 _delegatee_votes = getVotes(delegatee);
uint256 _third_votes = getVotes(third);
uint256 _other_votes = getVotes(other);
// delegator loses all of their votes
// previous delegatee loses all of their votes
// delegatee gains that many votes
// third loses any votes delegated to them
assert _dr == 0, "delegator retained votes";
assert _de == de_ + delegator_bal, "delegatee not received votes";
assert _third != 0 => _third == third_ - delegator_bal, "votes not removed from third";
assert other_ == _other, "delegate not contained";
assert _delegatee_votes == delegatee_votes_ + delegator_bal, "delegatee did not receive votes";
assert third != 0 => _third_votes == third_votes_ - delegator_bal, "votes not removed from third";
assert other_votes_ == _other_votes, "delegate not contained";
}

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