Resolve#31609
This PR was initiated following my personal research to find the
lightest possible Single Sign-On solution for self-hosted setups. The
existing solutions often seemed too enterprise-oriented, involving many
moving parts and services, demanding significant resources while
promising planetary-scale capabilities. Others were adequate in
supporting basic OAuth2 flows but lacked proper user management
features, such as a change password UI.
Gitea hits the sweet spot for me, provided it supports more granular
access permissions for resources under users who accept the OAuth2
application.
This PR aims to introduce granularity in handling user resources as
nonintrusively and simply as possible. It allows third parties to inform
users about their intent to not ask for the full access and instead
request a specific, reduced scope. If the provided scopes are **only**
the typical ones for OIDC/OAuth2—`openid`, `profile`, `email`, and
`groups`—everything remains unchanged (currently full access to user's
resources). Additionally, this PR supports processing scopes already
introduced with [personal
tokens](https://docs.gitea.com/development/oauth2-provider#scopes) (e.g.
`read:user`, `write:issue`, `read:group`, `write:repository`...)
Personal tokens define scopes around specific resources: user info,
repositories, issues, packages, organizations, notifications,
miscellaneous, admin, and activitypub, with access delineated by read
and/or write permissions.
The initial case I wanted to address was to have Gitea act as an OAuth2
Identity Provider. To achieve that, with this PR, I would only add
`openid public-only` to provide access token to the third party to
authenticate the Gitea's user but no further access to the API and users
resources.
Another example: if a third party wanted to interact solely with Issues,
it would need to add `read:user` (for authorization) and
`read:issue`/`write:issue` to manage Issues.
My approach is based on my understanding of how scopes can be utilized,
supported by examples like [Sample Use Cases: Scopes and
Claims](https://auth0.com/docs/get-started/apis/scopes/sample-use-cases-scopes-and-claims)
on auth0.com.
I renamed `CheckOAuthAccessToken` to `GetOAuthAccessTokenScopeAndUserID`
so now it returns AccessTokenScope and user's ID. In the case of
additional scopes in `userIDFromToken` the default `all` would be
reduced to whatever was asked via those scopes. The main difference is
the opportunity to reduce the permissions from `all`, as is currently
the case, to what is provided by the additional scopes described above.
Screenshots:
![Screenshot_20241121_121405](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/29deaed7-4333-4b02-8898-b822e6f2463e)
![Screenshot_20241121_120211](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a4a4ef7-409c-4116-9d5f-2fe00eb37167)
![Screenshot_20241121_120119](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/aa52c1a2-212d-4e64-bcdf-7122cee49eb6)
![Screenshot_20241121_120018](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9eac318c-e381-4ea9-9e2c-3a3f60319e47)
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
We have some actions that leverage the Gitea API that began receiving
401 errors, with a message that the user was not found. These actions
use the `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` env var in the actions job to
authenticate with the Gitea API. The format of this env var in actions
jobs changed with go-gitea/gitea/pull/28885 to be a JWT (with a
corresponding update to `act_runner`) Since it was a JWT, the OAuth
parsing logic attempted to parse it as an OAuth token, and would return
user not found, instead of falling back to look up the running task and
assigning it to the actions user.
Make ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN in action runners could be used,
attempting to parse Oauth JWTs. The code to parse potential old
`ACTION_RUNTIME_TOKEN` was kept in case someone is running an older
version of act_runner that doesn't support the Actions JWT.
This will allow instance admins to view signup pattern patterns for
public instances. It is modelled after discourse, mastodon, and
MediaWiki's approaches.
Note: This has privacy implications, but as the above-stated open-source
projects take this approach, especially MediaWiki, which I have no doubt
looked into this thoroughly, it is likely okay for us, too. However, I
would be appreciative of any feedback on how this could be improved.
---------
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
https://github.com/go-fed/httpsig seems to be unmaintained.
Switch to github.com/42wim/httpsig which has removed deprecated crypto
and default sha256 signing for ssh rsa.
No impact for those that use ed25519 ssh certificates.
This is a breaking change for:
- gitea.com/gitea/tea (go-sdk) - I'll be sending a PR there too
- activitypub using deprecated crypto (is this actually used?)
This leverages the existing `sync_external_users` cron job to
synchronize the `IsActive` flag on users who use an OAuth2 provider set
to synchronize. This synchronization is done by checking for expired
access tokens, and using the stored refresh token to request a new
access token. If the response back from the OAuth2 provider is the
`invalid_grant` error code, the user is marked as inactive. However, the
user is able to reactivate their account by logging in the web browser
through their OAuth2 flow.
Also changed to support this is that a linked `ExternalLoginUser` is
always created upon a login or signup via OAuth2.
### Notes on updating permissions
Ideally, we would also refresh permissions from the configured OAuth
provider (e.g., admin, restricted and group mappings) to match the
implementation of LDAP. However, the OAuth library used for this `goth`,
doesn't seem to support issuing a session via refresh tokens. The
interface provides a [`RefreshToken`
method](https://github.com/markbates/goth/blob/master/provider.go#L20),
but the returned `oauth.Token` doesn't implement the `goth.Session` we
would need to call `FetchUser`. Due to specific implementations, we
would need to build a compatibility function for every provider, since
they cast to concrete types (e.g.
[Azure](https://github.com/markbates/goth/blob/master/providers/azureadv2/azureadv2.go#L132))
---------
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
Noteable additions:
- `redefines-builtin-id` forbid variable names that shadow go builtins
- `empty-lines` remove unnecessary empty lines that `gofumpt` does not
remove for some reason
- `superfluous-else` eliminate more superfluous `else` branches
Rules are also sorted alphabetically and I cleaned up various parts of
`.golangci.yml`.
Cookies may exist on "/subpath" and "/subpath/" for some legacy reasons (eg: changed CookiePath behavior in code). The legacy cookie should be removed correctly.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Kyle D <kdumontnu@gmail.com>
This PR fixed a bug when the user switching pages too fast, he will
logout automatically.
The reason is that when the error is context cancelled, the previous
code think user hasn't login then the session will be deleted. Now it
will return the errors but not think it's not login.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Since `modules/context` has to depend on `models` and many other
packages, it should be moved from `modules/context` to
`services/context` according to design principles. There is no logic
code change on this PR, only move packages.
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/context` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context`
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/contexttest` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/contexttest` because of depending on
context
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/upload` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context/upload` because of depending on
context
Old code is not consistent for generating & decoding the JWT secrets.
Now, the callers only need to use 2 consistent functions:
NewJwtSecretWithBase64 and DecodeJwtSecretBase64
And remove a non-common function Base64FixedDecode from util.go
Fixes#28660
Fixes an admin api bug related to `user.LoginSource`
Fixed `/user/emails` response not identical to GitHub api
This PR unifies the user update methods. The goal is to keep the logic
only at one place (having audit logs in mind). For example, do the
password checks only in one method not everywhere a password is updated.
After that PR is merged, the user creation should be next.
## Changes
- Add deprecation warning to `Token` and `AccessToken` authentication
methods in swagger.
- Add deprecation warning header to API response. Example:
```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
Warning: token and access_token API authentication is deprecated
...
```
- Add setting `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN` to reject query string auth
tokens entirely. Default is `false`
## Next steps
- `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN` should be true in a subsequent release and
the methods should be removed in swagger
- `DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN` should be removed and the implementation of
the auth methods in question should be removed
## Open questions
- Should there be further changes to the swagger documentation?
Deprecation is not yet supported for security definitions (coming in
[OpenAPI Spec version
3.2.0](https://github.com/OAI/OpenAPI-Specification/issues/2506))
- Should the API router logger sanitize urls that use `token` or
`access_token`? (This is obviously an insufficient solution on its own)
---------
Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
Fixes#27819
We have support for two factor logins with the normal web login and with
basic auth. For basic auth the two factor check was implemented at three
different places and you need to know that this check is necessary. This
PR moves the check into the basic auth itself.
The steps to reproduce it.
First, create a new oauth2 source.
Then, a user login with this oauth2 source.
Disable the oauth2 source.
Visit users -> settings -> security, 500 will be displayed.
This is because this page only load active Oauth2 sources but not all
Oauth2 sources.
Closes#27455
> The mechanism responsible for long-term authentication (the 'remember
me' cookie) uses a weak construction technique. It will hash the user's
hashed password and the rands value; it will then call the secure cookie
code, which will encrypt the user's name with the computed hash. If one
were able to dump the database, they could extract those two values to
rebuild that cookie and impersonate a user. That vulnerability exists
from the date the dump was obtained until a user changed their password.
>
> To fix this security issue, the cookie could be created and verified
using a different technique such as the one explained at
https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies.
The PR removes the now obsolete setting `COOKIE_USERNAME`.
When the user does not set a username lookup condition, LDAP will get an
empty string `""` for the user, hence the following code
```
if isExist, err := user_model.IsUserExist(db.DefaultContext, 0, sr.Username)
```
The user presence determination will always be nonexistent, so updates
to user information will never be performed.
Fix#27049
Part of #27065
This reduces the usage of `db.DefaultContext`. I think I've got enough
files for the first PR. When this is merged, I will continue working on
this.
Considering how many files this PR affect, I hope it won't take to long
to merge, so I don't end up in the merge conflict hell.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>